MIKE

Posts Tagged ‘Derivatives’

by Tyler Durden
11/26/2011
ZeroHedge

While everyone was focused on the impending European collapse, the latest soon to be refuted rumors of a quick fix from the Welt am Sonntag notwithstanding, the Bank of International Settlements reported a number that quietly slipped through the cracks of the broader media. Which is paradoxical because it is the biggest everreported in the financial world: the number in question is $707,568,901,000,000 and represents the latest total amount of all notional Over The Counter (read unregulated) outstanding derivatives reported by the world’s financial institutions to the BIS for its semi-annual OTC derivatives report titled “OTC derivatives market activity in the first half of 2011.” Indicatively, global GDP is about $63 trillion if one can trust any numbers released by modern governments. Said otherwise, for the six month period ended June 30, 2011, the total number of outstanding derivatives surged past the previous all time high of $673 trillion from June 2008, and is now firmly in 7-handle territory: the synthetic credit bubble has now been blown to a new all time high. Another way of looking at the data is that one of the key contributors to global growth and prosperity in the past 10 years was an increase in total derivatives from just under $100 trillion to $708 trillion in exactly one decade. And soon we have to pay the mean reversion price.

What is probably just as disturbing is that in the first 6 months of 2011, the total outstanding notional of all derivatives rose from $601 trillion at December 31, 2010 to $708 trillion at June 30, 2011. A $107 trillion increase in notional in half a year. Needless to say this is the biggest increase in history. So why did the notional increase by such an incomprehensible amount? Simple: based on some widely accepted (and very much wrong) definitions of gross market value (not to be confused with gross notional), the value of outstanding derivatives actually declined in the first half of the year from $21.3 trillion to $19.5 trillion (a number still 33% greater than US GDP). Which means that in order to satisfy what likely threatened to become a self-feeding margin call as the (previously) $600 trillion derivatives market collapsed on itself, banks had to sell more, more, more derivatives in order to collect recurring and/or upfront premia and to pad their books with GAAP-endorsed delusions of future derivative based cash flows. Because derivatives in addition to a core source of trading desk P&L courtesy of wide bid/ask spreads (there is a reason banks want to keep them OTC and thus off standardization and margin-destroying exchanges) are also terrific annuities for the status quo. Just ask Buffett why he sold a multi-billion index put on the US stock market. The answer is simple – if he ever has to make good on it, it is too late.

Which brings us to the the chart showing total outstanding notional derivatives by 6 month period below. The shaded area is what that the BIS, the bank regulators, and the OCC urgently hope that the general public promptly forgets about and brushes under the carpet.

Try not to laugh. Or cry. Or gloss over, because when it comes to visualizing $708 trillion most really are incapable of doing so.

Total outstanding gross market value by 6 month period:

There is much more than can be said on this topic, and has to be said, because an increase of that magnitude is simply impossible to perceive without alarm bells going off everywhere, especially when one considers the pervasive deleveraging occurring at every sector but the government. All else equal, this move may well explain the massive surge in bank profitability in the first half of the year. It also means that with banks suffering massive losses, and rumors of bank runs and collateral calls, not to mention the aftermath of the MF Global insolvency, the world financial syndicate will have no choice but to increase gross notional even more, even as the market value continues to get ever lower, thus sparking the risk of the mother of all margin calls: a veritable credit fission reaction.

But no matter what: the important thing to remember is that “they are all hedged” – or so they say, a claim we made a completely mockery of a few weeks back. So ex-sarcasm, the now parabolic increase in derivatives means that when the bilateral netting chain is once again broken, and it will be (because AIG was not a one off event), there will simply be trillions more in derivatives that no longer generate a booked cash flow stream for the remaining counterparty, until at the very end, the whole inverted credit0money pyramid collapses in on itself.

And for those wondering what the distinction is between notional and

Notional amounts outstanding: Nominal or notional amounts outstanding are defined as the gross nominal or notional value of all deals concluded and not yet settled on the reporting date. For contracts with variable nominal or notional principal amounts, the basis for reporting is the nominal or notional principal amounts at the time of reporting.

 

Nominal or notional amounts outstanding provide a measure of market size and a reference from which contractual payments are determined in derivatives markets. However, such amounts are generally not those truly at risk. The amounts at risk in derivatives contracts are a function of the price level and/or volatility of the financial reference index used in the determination of contract payments, the duration and liquidity of contracts, and the creditworthiness of counterparties. They are also a function of whether an exchange of notional principal takes place between counterparties. Gross market values provide a more accurate measure of the scale of financial risk transfer taking place in derivatives markets.

Well, no. It is logical that the BIS will advise everyone to ignore the bigger number and focus on the small one: just like everyone was told to ignore gross exposure and focus on net… until Jefferies had to dump all of its gross PIIGS exposure or stare bankruptcy in the face; so no – the correct thing to say is “gross market values provide a more accurate measure of the scale of financial risk transfer” if one assumes there is no counterparty risk. Because once the whole bilateral netting chain is broken, net becomes gross. And gross market value becomes total notional outstanding. And, to quote Hudson, it’s game over.

As for the largely irrelevant gross market value, which is only relevant in as much as it will be the catalyst which will precipitate margin calls on the underlying notionals, all $700+ trillion of them:

Gross positive and negative market values: Gross market values are defined as the sums of the absolute values of all open contracts with either positive or negative replacement values evaluated at market prices prevailing on the reporting date. Thus, the gross positive market value of a dealer’s outstanding contracts is the sum of the replacement values of all contracts that are in a current gain position to the reporter at current market prices (and therefore, if they were settled immediately, would represent claims on counterparties). The gross negative market value is the sum of the values of all contracts that have a negative value on the reporting date (ie those that are in a current loss position and therefore, if they were settled immediately, would represent liabilities of the dealer to its counterparties).

 

The term “gross” indicates that contracts with positive and negative replacement values with the same counterparty are not netted. Nor are the sums of positive and negative contract values within a market risk category such as foreign exchange contracts, interest rate contracts, equities and commodities set off against one another.

 

As stated above, gross market values supply information about the potential scale of market risk in derivatives transactions. Furthermore, gross market value at current market prices provides a measure of economic significance that is readily comparable across markets and products.

And here again, what they ignore to add is that the measure of economic significance is only relevant in as much as the world’s banks don’t begin a Lehman-MF Global tango of mutual margin call annihilation. In that case, no. They are not measures of anything except for what some banks plug into some models to spit out a favorable EPS treatment at the end of the quarter.

Expect to see gross market value declines persisting even as the now parabolic increase in total notional persists. At this rate we would not be surprised to see one quadrillion in OTC derivatives by the middle of next year.

And, once again for those confused, the fact that notional had to increase so epically as market value tumbled most likely means that the global derivative pyramid scheme (no pun intended) is almost over.

Read the entire article HERE.

By Ben Berkowitz
Yahoo! News: Reuters
September 21, 2011

NEW YORK (Reuters) – The Federal Reserve’s latest move to stimulate credit for consumers and businesses, known as Operation Twist, is likely to threaten the earnings of some of the country’s largest insurers for years to come.

Wall Street in the past week has dimmed its view of MetLife, Prudential Financial and other big insurers, forecasting that they will have to cope with low rates and weak market returns through the end of 2011 and possibly well beyond.

The problem is that returns on insurers’ investment portfolios can’t keep pace with the obligations they have accumulated from torrid sales of annuities and life policies over the past few years.

“Ultimately I think it’s going to be a challenge to business models,” said Gregory Staples, co-head of U.S. fixed income portfolio management at Deutsche Insurance Asset Management, the world’s largest asset manager for insurers.

Insurers were demonstrating sound financial management in purchasing long-term bonds with the premiums they collected to balance their long-term obligations. But if the Fed’s Operation Twist is successfully executed it will push long-term rates lower and, according to some experts, force insurers to retrench on product sales.

No one is suggesting Twist will put insurers out of business, but it is exacerbating a problem that they have been contending with since the financial crisis of 2008.

Under Operation Twist, as announced Wednesday, the Federal Reserve sell shorter-term notes to buy longer-dates Treasuries. That will have the effect of keeping longer-term interest rates down, which the Fed hopes will spur consumers to borrow and spend.

“Folks have brought the low interest-rate environment up to No. 1 priority,” said Doug French, managing principal of the insurance and actuarial advisory practice at Ernst & Young. “We’re not going to get any relief from interest rates for the next two to three years.”

The accounting firm has modeled the investment return needs of the 25 largest life insurers over the next three years to determine what will happen if rates remain static or fall further.

“Their general account yields (in aggregate) are going to decrease by about 51 basis points over the next three years, and that’s a cumulative effect,” French said. “The life industry is under spread compression. It’s just going to continue, and, in fact, it’s going to get worse.

ONGOING PROBLEM

Annuities, a little understood but increasingly popular alternative for older Americans, are a paradoxical problem for insurers when rates plummet.

Limra, a marketing and research group for life insurers, estimates that 35 percent of U.S. retirees receive income from annuities. MetLife, the largest life insurer in the United States, reported that annuity sales rose 48 percent in this year’s second quarter.

Many of the products are sold with a guaranteed minimum benefit in return for an upfront payment. That means that regardless of the strength or weakness of the markets, the insurer has to write a check that doesn’t vary throughout the life of the product.

And that life is getting longer. Several insurers late last year warned that people were holding on to their annuities rather than cashing them out to invest in higher-return products. That creates a bigger nut for the insurers at a time when markets and the central bank aren’t cooperating.

“Once you get a little further out, there’s a very strong consensus that interest rates need to rise,” said JMP Securities analyst Matt Carletti. He and others said insurers are resigning themselves to anemic rates of return.

“Everybody expects a rise in interest rates but few expect it to happen any time soon,” Carletti said.

Rates on 10-year U.S. Treasuries prior to the Fed’s announcement were about 40 basis points below their previous 60-year low and almost two percentage points below their trailing five-year average, according to research from Oppenheimer.

Travelers Companies said earlier this month that 10 percent of its long-term fixed income investments mature annually through 2014 at an approximate yield of 5 percent. If Travelers reinvests that in Treasuries, the yield is likely to be two to three percentage points lower.

The prospect of anemic returns may be one reason why insurance shares have underperformed the broader market in six of the last seven months.

Shares were broadly lower after the Fed’s announcement.

NO ALTERNATIVES

Several insurers that were hoping for moderate interest-rate relief by now may consider higher-risk investment alternatives eventually, though not yet.

Deutsche IAM said some insurance clients have been seeking to invest in bank loans and other alternatives to traditional stocks and bonds if they could find yields higher than 3 percent, though their appetite has cooled.

“With the recent volatility in the marketplace and the recent sell-off and concern about risk there’s been a bit of a pullback in the interest in those asset classes,” Deutsche’s Staples said.

Most everyone agrees that insurers can sustain themselves during a prolonged period of low rates and meet their obligations through their cash flow rather than investment returns. But the question is what happens if rates do not rise in a few years.

“Let’s say, hypothetically, you’re in a low interest rate environment for the next five to 10 years, you’d have to say you’ve got to change your product mix, you’ve got to change what you’re selling,” Ernst & Young’s French said.

Read the entire article HERE.

by Wall Street for Main Street
August 15, 2011

Heidi is the proprietor of a bar in Detroit …

She realizes that virtually all of her customers are unemployed alcoholics and, as such, can no longer afford to patronize her bar.

To solve this problem, she comes up with a new marketing plan that allows her customers to drink now, but pay later.

Heidi keeps track of the drinks consumed on a ledger (thereby granting the customers loans).

Word gets around about Heidi’s “drink now, pay later” marketing strategy and, as a result, increasing numbers of customers flood into Heidi’s bar. Soon she has the largest sales volume for any bar in Detroit .

By providing her customers freedom from immediate payment demands, Heidi gets no resistance when, at regular intervals, she substantially increases her prices for wine and beer, the most consumed beverages.

Consequently, Heidi’s gross sales volume increases massively.

A young and dynamic vice-president at the local bank recognizes that these customer debts constitute valuable future assets and increases Heidi’s borrowing limit.

He sees no reason for any undue concern because he has the debts of the unemployed alcoholics as collateral!

At the bank’s corporate headquarters, expert traders figure a way to make huge commissions, and transform these customer loans into DRINKBONDS.

These “securities” then are bundled and traded on international securities markets.

Naive investors don’t really understand that the securities being sold to them as “AAA Secured Bonds” really are debts of unemployed alcoholics. Nevertheless, the bond prices continuously climb – and the securities soon become the hottest-selling items for some of the nation’s leading brokerage houses.

One day, even though the bond prices still are climbing, a risk manager at the original local bank decides that the time has come to demand payment on the debts incurred by the drinkers at Heidi’s bar. He so informs Heidi.

Heidi then demands payment from her alcoholic patrons. But, being unemployed alcoholics — they cannot pay back their drinking debts.

Since Heidi cannot fulfill her loan obligations she is forced into bankruptcy. The bar closes and Heidi’s 11 employees lose their jobs.

Overnight, DRINKBOND prices drop by 90%.

The collapsed bond asset value destroys the bank’s liquidity and prevents it from issuing new loans, thus freezing credit and economic activity in the community.

The suppliers of Heidi’s bar had granted her generous payment extensions and had invested their firms’ pension funds in the BOND securities.

They find they are now faced with having to write off her bad debt and with losing over 90% of the presumed value of the bonds.

Her wine supplier also claims bankruptcy, closing the doors on a family business that had endured for three generations, her beer supplier is taken over by a competitor, who immediately closes the local plant and lays off 150 workers.

Fortunately though, the bank, the brokerage houses and their respective executives are saved and bailed out by a multibillion dollar no-strings attached cash infusion from the government.

The funds required for this bailout are obtained by newtaxes levied on employed, middle-class, nondrinkers who have never been in Heidi’s bar.

Now do you understand?

Read the original post HERE.

by Charles Hugh Smith
July 20, 2011
OfTwoMinds

Housing has been propped up by Central State intervention. As that ends, Phase II of the retrace to pre-bubble valuations is at hand.

Has housing bottomed? Here is the sure-fire way to tell:

Stories titled “Has housing bottomed? Here’s how to tell” have vanished for lack of interest.

The absence of stories about the bottom in housing will mark the final nadir, because the real bottom can only be reached when everyone has abandoned housing as a pathway to easy money. Only when the public and investor class alike have completely lost interest in real estate as a “sure-fire” investment can the real trough be reached.

This destruction of long-held habits and beliefs takes a long time. The closest analogy might be the stock market in the last secular Bear market. Stocks topped out in 1966, though the economy lumbered on until 1969 before faltering. Stocks then meandered for 13 years of stagflation, losing 66% of their inflation adjusted value in 1966 by 1982.

People gave up on stocks. I call this loss of faith “when belief in the system fades:” note how household participation in stocks topped out in 1969, three years after the peak in the market. Participants clung to their belief in stocks for about four years after 1969, at which point participation cratered as they finally abandoned their faith in a “permanent Bull market.”

Household participation fell by two-thirds and remained low for years.

In August 2006, near the top of the housing bubble, I suggested a three-part scenario for the housing bust: it would take eight more years to play out, and the declines would occur in sharp downlegs following a phase-shift model.

Phase Transitions, Symmetry and Post-Bubble Declines (August 2, 2006)

Here is the chart I presented at that time as a possible time model:

Here we see the first phase shift decline and the Central State engineered “recovery,” which has now rolled over.

Here is CoreLogic’s snapshot of housing (via Calculated Risk). There is still a long way to go down before the market retraces the entire bubble.

The Federal Reserve has bet that housing valuations can be propped up by lowering the interest rate on mortgages. To the degree that a few fence-sitters might be tempted to take the plunge, lower rates have a modest follow-through–but the real determinant of housing is employment, which as we all know, has tanked.

Here’s the civilian employment ratio, which reflects the percentage of the labor force that has a job:

Perhaps even more telling is the per capita rate of employment:

By this broad measure, employment has declined to levels last seen thirty years ago. We can also look for clues to housing’s future by looking at wages, which have dropped steeply:

These charts pose a simple yet profound question: how can people buy a still-expensive house if they don’t have a job, or their income is plummeting?

The proximate triggers for the next phase-shift down include a decline in Central State intervention in the housing market and a return to official “recession” as the “soft patch” turns into a quagmire.

In an era where “market sentiment” swings wildly from day to day and the nation awaits every quarterly report from Apple as the “definitive” bellwether not just on stocks but the entire Galactic Mood, then the notion that trends can take years to play out doesn’t sit well with our impatient demands for a “bottom.” But long-term trends take years to play out, whether we like it or not.

Read the entire article HERE.

by Tyler Durden
ZeroHedge
06/18/2011 13:23 -0400

One small step toward Executive Order 6102 part 2, and one giant leap for corruptcongressmankind.

From: FOREX.com
Date: Fri, Jun 17, 2011 at 6:11 PM
Subject: Important Account Notice Re: Metals Trading
To: xxx

Important Account Notice Re: Metals Trading

We wanted to make you aware of some upcoming changes to FOREX.com’s product offering. As a result of the Dodd-Frank Act enacted by US Congress, a new regulation prohibiting US residents from trading over the counter precious metals, including gold and silver, will go into effect on Friday, July 15, 2011.

In conjunction with this new regulation, FOREX.com must discontinue metals trading for US residents on Friday, July 15, 2011 at the close of trading at 5pm ET. As a result, all open metals positions must be closed by July 15, 2011 at 5pm ET.

We encourage you to wind down your trading activity in these products over the next month in anticipation of the new rule, as any open XAU or XAG positions that remain open prior to July 15, 2011 at approximately 5:00 pm ET will be automatically liquidated.

We sincerely regret any inconvenience complying with the new U.S. regulation may cause you. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact our customer service team.

Sincerely,
The Team at FOREX.com

So far we have only received this warning from Forex.com. We are waiting to see which other dealers inform their customers that trading gold and silver over the counter will soon be illegal.

It appears that Forex.com’s interpretation of the law stems primarily from Section 742(a) of the Dodd-Frank act which “prohibits any person [which again includes companies]from entering into, or offering to enter into, a transaction in any commodity with a person that is not an eligible contract participant or an eligible commercial entity, on a leveraged or margined basis.”

Some prehistory from Hedge Fund Law Blog:

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Act”) has changed a number of laws in all of the securities acts including the Commodity Exchange Act. Two specific changes deal with certain transactions in commodities on the spot market. Specifically, Section 742 of the Act deals with retail commodity transactions. In this section, the text of the Commodity Exchange Act is amended to include new Section 2(c)(2)(D) (dealing with retail commodity transactions) and new Section 2(c)(2)(E) (prohibiting trading in spot forex with retail investors unless the trader is subject to regulations by a Federal regulatory agency, i.e. CFTC, SEC, etc.). According to a congressional rulemaking spreadsheet, these are effective 180 days from the date of enactment.

We provide an overview of the new sections and have reprinted them in full below.

New CEA Section 2(c)(2)(D) – Concerning Spot Commodities (Metals)

The central import of new CEA Section 2(c)(2)(D) is to broaden the CFTC’s power with respect to retail commodity transactions. Essentially any spot commodities transaction (i.e. spot metals) will be subject to CFTC jurisdiction and rulemaking authority. There is an exemption for commodities which are actually delivered within 28 days. While the CFTC wanted an exemption in which commodities would need to be delivered within 2 days, various coin collectors were able to lobby congress for a longer delivery period (see here).

It is likely we will see the CFTC propose regulations under this new section and we will keep you updated on any regulatory pronouncements with respect to this new section.

New CEA Section 2(c)(2)(E) – Concerning Spot Forex

The central import of new CEA Section 2(c)(2)(E) is to regulate the spot forex markets. While the section requires the CFTC to finalize regulations with respect to spot forex (which were proposed earlier in January), it also, interestingly, provides oversight of the markets to other federal regulatory agencies such as the CFTC. This means that in the future, different market participants may be subject to different regulatory regimes with respect to trading in same underlying instruments. A Wall Street Journal article discusses the impact of this with respect to firms which engage in other activities in addition to retail forex transactions. The CFTC’s proposed rules establish certain compliance parameters for retail forex transactions, requires registration of retail forex managers and requires such managers to pass a new regulatory exam called the Series 34 exam. We do not yet know whether the other regulatory agencies will adopt rules similar to the CFTC or if they will write rules from scratch.

Next, from Henderson & Lyman:

The prohibition of Section 742(a) does not apply, however, if such a transaction results in actual delivery within 28 days, or creates an enforceable obligation to deliver between a seller and a buyer that have the ability to deliver, and accept delivery of, the commodity in connection with their lines of business. This may be problematic as in most spot metals trading virtually all contracts fail to meet these requirements. As a result, although the courts’ interpretation of Section 742(a) is unknown, Section 742(a) is likely to have a significantly negative impact on the OTC cash precious metals industry. Here too, it is essential that those who offer to be a counterparty to OTC metals transactions seek professional help to discuss possible operational and regulatory contingency plans.

The actual rule language exempts a transaction if it “results in actual delivery within 28 days or such other longer period as the Commission may determine by rule or regulation based upon the typical commercial practice in cash or spot markets for the commodity involved;” Alas, the commission has decided not to intervene and keep the exemption status window so small as to affect virtually all exchanges which transact in the gold and silver spot market.

More here:

Elimination of OTC Forex

Effective 90 days from its inception, the Dodd-Frank Act bans most retail OTC forex transactions. Section 742(c) of the Act states as follows:

…A person [which includes companies] shall not offer to, or enter into with, a person that is not an eligible contract participant, any agreement, contract, or transaction in foreign currency except pursuant to a rule or regulation of a Federal regulatory agency allowing the agreement, contract, or transaction under such terms and conditions as the Federal regulatory agency shall prescribe…

This provision will not come into effect, however, if the CFTC or another eligible federal body issues guidelines relating to the regulation of foreign currency within 90 days of its enactment. Registrants and the public are currently being encouraged by the CFTC to provide insight into how the Act should be enforced. See CFTC Rulemakings regarding OTC Derivatives located at the following website address, under Section XX – Foreign Currency (Retail Off Exchange). It is essential that OTC forex participants seek professional help to discuss possible operational and regulatory contingency plans.

Elimination of OTC Metals

As for OTC precious metals such as gold or silver, Section 742(a) of the Act prohibits any person [which again includes companies]from entering into, or offering to enter into, a transaction in any commodity with a person that is not an eligible contract participant or an eligible commercial entity, on a leveraged or margined basis. This provision intends to expand the narrow so called “Zelener fix” in the Farm Bill previously ratified by congress in 2008. The Farm Bill empowered the CFTC to pursue anti-fraud actions involving rolling spot transactions and/or other leveraged forex transactions without the need to prove that they are futures contracts. The Dodd-Frank Act now expands this authority to include virtually all retail cash commodity market products that involve leverage or margin – in other words OTC precious metals.

The prohibition of Section 742(a) does not apply, however, if such a transaction results in actual delivery within 28 days, or creates an enforceable obligation to deliver between a seller and a buyer that have the ability to deliver, and accept delivery of, the commodity in connection with their lines of business. This may be problematic as in most spot metals trading virtually all contracts fail to meet these requirements. As a result, although the courts’ interpretation of Section 742(a) is unknown, Section 742(a) is likely to have a significantly negative impact on the OTC cash precious metals industry. Here too, it is essential that those who offer to be a counterparty to OTC metals transactions seek professional help to discuss possible operational and regulatory contingency plans.

Small Pool Exemption Eliminated

Pursuant to Section 403 of Act, the “privateadviser” exemption, namelySection 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), will be eliminated within one year of the Act’s effective date (July 21, 2011). Historically, many unregistered U.S. fund managers had relied on this exemption to avoid registration where they:

(1) had fewer than 15 clients in the past 12 months;

(2) do not hold themselves out generally to the public as investment advisers; and

(3) do not act as investment advisers to a registered investment company or business development company.

At present, advisers can treat the unregistered funds that they advise, rather than the investors in those funds, as their clients for purposes of this exemption. A common practice has thus evolved whereby certain advisers manage up to 14 unregistered funds without having to register under the Advisers Act. Accordingly, the removal of this exemption represents a significant shift in the regulatory landscape, as this practice will no longer be allowable in approximately one year.

Also an important consideration, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates new federal registration and regulation thresholds based on the amount of assets a manager has under management (“AUM”). Although not yet underway, it is possible that various states may enact legislation designed to create a similar registration framework for managers whose AUM fall beneath the new federal levels.

Accredited Investor Qualifications

Section 413(a) of the Act alters the financial qualifications of who can be considered an accredited investor, and thus a qualified as eligible participant (“QEP”). Specifically, the revised accredited investor standard includes only the following types of individuals:

1) A natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with spouse, is at least $1,000,000, excluding the value of such investor’s primary residence;

2) A natural person who had individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year; or

3) A director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or a director, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer.

Based on this language, it is important to note that the revised accredited investor standard only applies to new investors and does not cover existing investors. However, additional subscriptions from existing investors are generally treated as requiring confirmation of continuing investor eligibility.

On July 27th, 2010, the SEC provided additional clarity regarding the valuation of an individual’s primary residence when calculating net worth. In particular, the SEC has interpreted this provision as follows:

Section 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act does not define the term “value,” nor does it address the treatment of mortgage and other indebtedness secured by the residence for purposes of the net worth calculation…Pending implementation of the changes to the Commission’s rules required by the Act, the related amount of indebtedness secured by the primary residence up to its fair market value may also be excluded. Indebtedness secured by the residence in excess of the value of the home should be considered a liability and deducted from the investor’s net worth.

Read the entire article HERE.

by Mark Mobius
Investment Adventures In Emerging Markets
Business Insider
Jun. 15, 2011, 5:37 AM

I recently spoke at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan in Tokyo, where we covered a number of interesting topics. Following that event, you may have recently read headlines where the media has quoted me as predicting a second financial crisis. In this post, I’d like to give a little more context to that comment and also cover something I am particularly worried about: the problem of derivatives.

Market volatility is a reality of today and goes in two directions, up and down. One of the reasons we have (and are likely to continue to see) this level of volatility is because of the occasional misuse of derivatives. Of course, not all derivatives are bad. If understood and used appropriately they can be used by funds as tools to hedge or mitigate risk. For example, currency forwards or interest rate swaps are typically used to hedge out a fund’s risk related to a specific currency or interest rate exposure.

What I am most concerned about is the use of derivatives as speculative tools or derivatives that involve high levels of leverage where the investor did not adequately control the implied leverage and resulting market exposures and liabilities, such as companies that may use derivatives to “game” commodity exposures—a practice that generally makes it more difficult to accurately assess the value of a company’s stock. For example, an airline may start out using oil futures contracts to hedge the risk of a rise in the price of jet fuel, but may drift from this understandable hedging use into speculating on the price of oil—a potentially risky activity that is somewhat removed from its core business of air transport. Misusing these financial instruments contributed significantly to the global financial crisis in 2008, and they continue to be used today. The total value of derivatives in the world at the end of 2010 was more than $600 trillion. That’s 10 times the world’s total GDP.[1]

When we have many derivative instruments betting in different directions with a lack of understanding and regulation, we are likely to have more volatility. Add to that the unforeseen and unpredictable events that occur across the world, together with an even more interconnected global marketplace, and we are likely to have more sharp and sudden moves in the market as knee-jerk reactions become more common among many investors. Such heightened volatility can scare people away from equity investments, which is a pity, since study after study has shown that in the long term, equities have outperformed.

We cannot exactly predict when the next market correction will hit us, nor know how great or small it will be, but we do realize that market volatility is here to stay. Few of the problems that caused the 2008 financial crisis have been resolved—banks are bigger than ever, and the derivatives market continues to grow and remains largely unregulated. It is heartening to see that international policymakers are trying to work toward a global regulatory standard, but until we find a true, long-term solution to these problems, we cannot ignore the possibility of another financial crisis.

But, as a long-standing English proverb tells us, we can “hope for the best and prepare for the worst.” With every crisis comes great opportunity. Therefore, we continue to invest with a long-term horizon in companies that we believe are undervalued, fundamentally strong and growing, and those that we think can weather through difficult times. Our long-term, ground-up, disciplined investing approach has kept us in good stead through the volatility so far and, I believe, could see us through potential crises or corrections that may loom around the corner.

Read the entire article HERE.

By John Carney
Thursday, 16 Jun 2011
Senior Editor, CNBC.com

Some of the safest, plain-vanilla investment accounts in the U.S. could be challenged if Greece defaults on its sovereign debt.

Forty-four percent of mutual fund assets in the U.S. are invested in the short-term debt of European banks, according to a report from Fitch.

A separate report from Moody’s noted that 55 percent of those holdings are in the commercial paper of French banks, such as Societe Generale, BNP Paribas [BNP-FR 51.11 --- UNCH ] and Credit Agricole. French banks are some of biggest creditors to Greece, with over $53 billion in outstanding loans to the Greek government and private sector.

While fund managers have had plenty of warning of the potential of a default in Greece, many would likely still be caught off guard. Many fund managers assume that a bailout will prevent a default by Greece.

The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers similarly caught money-market fund managers off guard, famously causing the Reserve Fund to “break the buck.”

The debt of these French banks is still very highly rated and Moody’s says the risk of default on the short-term debt is very low. But the high ratings assume that the probability of a default by Greece is very low.

If Greece defaults, it is possible that the market value of the commercial paper of French banks could plummet and the ratings could be downgraded. Money-market funds would likely refuse to fund new issuances of the short term debt, creating a liquidity problem for the French banks.

Other European banks would likely face pressure as investors tried to measure their exposure to Greece and those over-exposed to Greece.

One thing that may help money-market funds weather the Greece storm better than the Lehman hurricane is that they now have an implicit US government backing. While no longer directly insured by the FDIC, many believe that in a crisis the government would once again step in to insure the accounts, just as it did in 2008.

Read the entire article HERE.

By MICHAEL POWELL and GRETCHEN MORGENSON
New York Times
Published: March 5, 2011

FOR more than a decade, the American real estate market resembled an overstuffed novel, which is to say, it was an engrossing piece of fiction.

Mortgage brokers hip deep in profits handed out no-doc mortgages to people with fictional incomes. Wall Street shopped bundles of those loans to investors, no matter how unappetizing the details. And federal regulators gave sleepy nods.

That world largely collapsed under the weight of its improbabilities in 2008.

But a piece of that world survives on Library Street in Reston, Va., where an obscure business, the MERS Corporation, claims to hold title to roughly half of all the home mortgages in the nation — an astonishing 60 million loans.

Never heard of MERS? That’s fine with the mortgage banking industry—as MERS is starting to overheat and sputter. If its many detractors are correct, this private corporation, with a full-time staff of fewer than 50 employees, could turn out to be a very public problem for the mortgage industry.

Judges, lawmakers, lawyers and housing experts are raising piercing questions about MERS, which stands for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, whose private mortgage registry has all but replaced the nation’s public land ownership records. Most questions boil down to this:

How can MERS claim title to those mortgages, and foreclose on homeowners, when it has not invested a dollar in a single loan?

And, more fundamentally: Given the evidence that many banks have cut corners and made colossal foreclosure mistakes, does anyone know who owns what or owes what to whom anymore?

The answers have implications for all American homeowners, but particularly the millions struggling to save their homes from foreclosure. How the MERS story plays out could deal another blow to an ailing real estate market, even as the spring buying season gets under way.

MERS has distanced itself from the dubious behavior of some of its members, and the company itself has not been accused of wrongdoing. But the legal challenges to MERS, its practices and its records are mounting.

The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled last year that MERS could no longer file foreclosure proceedings there, because it does not actually make or service any loans. Last month in Utah, a local judge made the no-less-striking decision to let a homeowner rip up his mortgage and walk away debt-free. MERS had claimed ownership of the mortgage, but the judge did not recognize its legal standing.

“The state court is attracted like a moth to the flame to the legal owner, and that isn’t MERS,” says Walter T. Keane, the Salt Lake City lawyer who represented the homeowner in that case.

And, on Long Island, a federal bankruptcy judge ruled in February that MERS could no longer act as an “agent” for the owners of mortgage notes. He acknowledged that his decision could erode the foundation of the mortgage business.

But this, Judge Robert E Grossman said, was not his fault.

“This court does not accept the argument that because MERS may be involved with 50 percent of all residential mortgages in the country,” he wrote, “that is reason enough for this court to turn a blind eye to the fact that this process does not comply with the law.”

With MERS under scrutiny, its chief executive, R. K. Arnold, who had been with the company since its founding in 1995, resigned earlier this year.

A BIRTH certificate, a marriage license, a death certificate: these public documents note many life milestones.

For generations of Americans, public mortgage documents, often logged in longhand down at the county records office, provided a clear indication of homeownership.

But by the 1990s, the centuries-old system of land records was showing its age. Many county clerk’s offices looked like something out of Dickens, with mortgage papers stacked high. Some clerks had fallen two years behind in recording mortgages.

For a mortgage banking industry in a hurry, this represented money lost. Most banks no longer hold onto mortgages until loans are paid off. Instead, they sell the loans to Wall Street, which bundles them into investments through a process known as securitization.

MERS, industry executives hoped, would pull record-keeping into the Internet age, even as it privatized it. Streamlining record-keeping, the banks argued, would make mortgages more affordable.

But for the mortgage industry, MERS was mostly about speed — and profits. MERS, founded 16 years ago by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and big banks like Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase, cut out the county clerks and became the owner of record, no matter how many times loans were transferred. MERS appears to sell loans to MERS ad infinitum.

This high-speed system made securitization easier and cheaper. But critics say the MERS system made it far more difficult for homeowners to contest foreclosures, as ownership was harder to ascertain.

MERS was flawed at conception, those critics say. The bankers who midwifed its birth hired Covington & Burling, a prominent Washington law firm, to research their proposal. Covington produced a memo that offered assurances that MERS could operate legally nationwide. No one, however, conducted a state-by-state study of real estate laws.

“They didn’t do the deep homework,” said an official involved in those discussions who spoke on condition of anonymity because he has clients involved with MERS. “So as far as anyone can tell their real theory was: ‘If we can get everyone on board, no judge will want to upend something that is reasonable and sensible and would screw up 70 percent of loans.’ ”

County officials appealed to Congress, arguing that MERS was of dubious legality. But this was the 1990s, an era of deregulation, and the mortgage industry won.

“We lost our revenue stream, and Americans lost the ability to immediately know who owned a piece of property,” said Mark Monacelli, the St. Louis County recorder in Duluth, Minn.

And so MERS took off. Its board gave its senior vice president, William Hultman, the rather extraordinary power to deputize an unlimited number of “vice presidents” and “assistant secretaries” drawn from the ranks of the mortgage industry.

The “nomination” process was near instantaneous. A bank entered a name into MERS’s Web site, and, in a blink, MERS produced a “certifying resolution,” signed by Mr. Hultman. The corporate seal was available to those deputies for $25.

As personnel policies go, this was a touch loose. Precisely how loose became clear when a lawyer questioned Mr. Hultman in April 2010 in a lawsuit related to its foreclosure against an Atlantic City cab driver.

How many vice presidents and assistant secretaries have you appointed? the lawyer asked.

“I don’t know that number,” Mr. Hultman replied.

Approximately?

“I wouldn’t even be able to tell you, right now.”

In the thousands?

“Yes.”

Each of those deputies could file loan transfers and foreclosures in MERS’s name. The goal, as with almost everything about the mortgage business at that time, was speed. Speed meant money.

ALAN GRAYSON has seen MERS’s record-keeping up close. From 2009 until this year, he served as the United States representative for Florida’s Eighth Congressional District — in the Orlando area, which was ravaged by foreclosures. Thousands of constituents poured through his office, hoping to fend off foreclosures. Almost all had papers bearing the MERS name.

“In many foreclosures, the MERS paperwork was squirrelly,” Mr. Grayson said. With no real legal authority, he says, Fannie and the banks eliminated the old system and replaced it with a privatized one that was unreliable.

A spokeswoman for MERS declined interview requests. In an e-mail, she noted that several state courts have ruled in MERS’s favor of late. She expressed confidence that MERS’s policies complied with state laws, even if MERS’s members occasionally strayed.

“At times, some MERS members have failed to follow those procedures and/or established state foreclosure rules,” the spokeswoman, Karmela Lejarde, wrote, “or to properly explain MERS and document MERS relationships in legal pleadings.”

Such cases, she said, “are outliers, reflecting case-specific problems in process, and did not repudiate the MERS business model.

Continue the article HERE.

By CHRIS GLORIOSO
Updated 8:48 AM EST, Fri, Feb 11, 2011

A German company is in high-level talks to acquire the New York Stock Exchange, Wall Street’s most recognizable institution. According to reports published in both the German and American financial press, Deutsche Borse, a Frankfurt-based stock exchange is seeking to take a 60 percent ownership interest in the NYSE. The merger would create the world’s largest financial exchange.

News of the deal sent both NYSE and Deutsche Borse stock soaring Thursday.

If US and European regulators sign off on the plan, the new parent company would have dual headquarters in Germany and America. The merger is not expected to result in major layoffs in New York. However, the ranks of face-to-face stock traders have already thinned considerably on Wall Street in recent years.

“Stock trading is a commodity business. There’s just no money in it anymore,” said Greg David, director of Business & Economics Reporting at the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism.

“The fifth largest stock trading firm in the world is located in an office park off the New Jersey Turnpike, so it’s a business that has to change.”

The merger rumblings were greeted positively by investors, largely because the deal with Deutsche Borse would give the NYSE an instant presence in the lucrative derivatives markets. Traditionalists in the stock business have expressed hesitation about that transition.

“The reason for the stock exchange was to raise capital for business,” said William Higgins, a retired trader who owns 70,000 shares of NYSE stock.

“These derivatives raise no capital. They’re a new method of gambling.”

Posted on Tuesday, July 20, 2010, 12:00AM
by Robert Kiyosaki

The world knows BP is a disaster, a monster of a disaster. BP’s disaster makes Hurricane Katrina look like a rain shower.

Every time a TV news station shows oil gushing from a broken pipe — one mile below the ocean’s surface — the world gets sick. Scenes of oil-soaked pelicans struggling for life both angers and saddens us. The financial losses endured by small businesses and fishermen cannot be imagined, let alone conveyed by the media interviews. BP is a disaster with a scope beyond comprehension.

I was in England when President Barack Obama blamed and criticized BP for this tragedy. His criticism sparked the anger of the British. Politicians wanted him to tone it down, to be more careful in his choice of words. British Prime Minister David Cameron told Obama not to “go after BP for the sake of it.” Virgin’s Richard Branson said he was “kicking a company while it was on its knees.” Their concern was not for the environment or those suffering the ravages of this disaster. Their concern was for the pensioners who are counting on BP for a secure retirement.

On June 17, London’s Daily Mail ran a headline screaming, “Obama Bullies BP into £13.5bn Fund for Oil Spill Victims… but British Pensioners will Pick Up the Bill.” The British are angry with Obama for pressuring BP to suspend dividend payments and set aside $20 billion for the cleanup. Obama’s strong-arm position has not only affected British pensioners, who own 40% of BP, but American pension funds, who own 39%, as well. In other words, the economic damage of the BP disaster goes far beyond the Gulf. The damage is spreading to pensions, pensioners, and portfolios all around the world.

An Atmosphere Changed

While in London, I decided to go to dinner at Canary Wharf, ground zero for the next BP. Only a few years ago, Canary Wharf was one of the centers of the financial universe. Condo prices were sky high, offices were packed, and high-paid bankers filled Canary Wharf with wealth and excitement. Today, Canary Wharf seems to be dying. It has lost its vibrancy. Many restaurants and offices were nearly empty and there were few lights to be seen in those once-high-priced condos.

And Canary Wharf’s ‘BP’ stands for Bomb Production. Canary Wharf is much like AIG, a factory for exotic financial products known as derivatives. The problem is that most people do not know what these murky and mysterious products are – and that includes the people who make them or buy them. It’s why Warren Buffett has called derivatives “financial weapons of mass destruction.” That is how powerful they are. During World War II, a ship exploded while loading bombs for transport at Port Chicago, California. The explosion flattened everything for miles. It is said that the ship’s anchor, which weighed tons, was found more than six miles away. Derivatives — financial bombs — have the same power if they accidently detonate inside a bank’s balance sheet.

The subprime disaster was a result of financial bombs — derivatives — exploding in financial institutions such as AIG and Lehman Brothers, as well as banks and financial institutions throughout the world. After the bombs AIG manufactured exploded, AIG received $181 billion in taxpayer funding and immediately sent $11.9 billion to France’s Société Générale, $11.8 billion to Deutsche Bank, and $8.5 billion to Barclays Bank of Britain. U.S. taxpayer money was going to bailout banks around the world. During the last three months of 2008, AIG was losing more than $27 million an hour. That is how powerful these derivatives can be. The problem I see is this: There are many more such bombs still sitting in balance sheets all over the world.

Financial Bombs All Over the World 

Military bombs are classified by weight: 500-, 750-, and 1,000-pound bombs. Financial bombs have interesting labels such as CDO (collateralized debt obligations), ABS (asset backed securities), and CDS (credit default swaps). While they sound exotic and sophisticated, when put in everyday language, a CDO is simply debt sold as an asset. And CDS, or swaps, are simply a form of insurance.

Since the insurance industry is strictly regulated, and the bomb factories producing CDS did not want to comply with insurance industry regulations, they simply called them ‘swaps,’ rather than insurance.

To make matters worse, rating agencies such as Moody’s and S&P (and even Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan) blessed these financial bombs as safe, sound, and good for you. It was almost as good as the pope blessing these products. In 2007, the subprime boom busted, and we know what happened from there.

The problem is that approximately $700 trillion of these financial time bombs are still in the system. While people watch the BP disaster in the Gulf, few people are aware of the other BP, the financial bomb production that is still going on. If this derivative market begins to collapse, we will see another BP disaster.

Can’t Clean Up the Next Disaster

Most of us know there is not enough money in the world to clean up the Gulf. The same is true with the $700 trillion derivatives market. If just 1% of the $700 trillion derivatives market goes bust, that is a $7 trillion disaster. The entire U.S. economy is only $14 trillion annually. A 10% failure, equating to $70 trillion, would probably bring down the world economy. As with the BP Gulf disaster, there is not enough money in the world to clean up the next BP disaster.

Read the entire article HERE.